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REGULATING SETTLEMENT: WHAT IS LEFT OF THE
RULE OF LAW IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS?
Nancy J. King*
INTRODUCTION
Consider what plea bargains would be like if legal rules were taken
more seriously than they currently are. A court would recognize a
defendant's willingness to be convicted of an offense only when cer-
tain conditions were met: (1) the defendant actually committed the
crime; (2) the defendant was punished with the penalty authorized by
law for that crime; (3) all government actors involved in the investiga-
tion, prosecution, defense, and adjudication of the case had complied
with the law governing the criminal process; and (4) the settlement
agreement did not relieve any of them of the duty to comply with the
law in the future. This ideal agreement has been replaced in many
cases by a bargain in which the government trades sentencing and
charging concessions for a defendant's promise not to seek a remedy
for past and future violations of legal rules. Put simply, the law is for
sale in criminal cases-and there are plenty of buyers.
Part II describes the spectrum of legal rights that parties are al-
lowed to exchange in the settlement of criminal cases. Part III sum-
marizes justifications for limiting this exchange. Part IV discusses why
judicially enforced attempts to regulate bargains in criminal cases may
instead only add to what is traded. It uses as an example recent pro-
posals to increase accuracy in negotiated criminal judgments. Part V
concludes by suggesting that meaningful changes in bargaining pat-
terns, including improvements in the accuracy of criminal settlements,
will require structural changes that are not subject to trading by par-
ties in any case.
II. BARGAINING AROUND THE LAW
A. Trading Procedural Law
Even though much of the law regulating criminal process is based
on constitutional protections, practically all of these protections may
* Lee S. & Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
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be traded for charging or sentencing concessions.' Professor William
Stuntz, one of the nation's leading scholars on this topic, put it suc-
cinctly: "In criminal trials, the Constitution is omnipresent. In guilty
pleas, it is nearly invisible."'2 Defendants agree to plead guilty to
charges that would otherwise be barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause 3 or the Ex Post Facto Clause. 4 They waive the right to be free
from illegal detention, biased judges or grand juries, police overreach-
ing, involuntary confessions, and unconstitutional searches. 5 They
trade away their access to exculpatory evidence, their right to enforce
evidentiary rules barring the use of statements made during bargain-
ing,6 and even claims of ineffective assistance of counsel leading up to
the plea.7
Plea agreements not only insulate past illegality from review; they
increasingly include promises by defendants to waive the right to chal-
lenge error that has yet to occur. In federal cases, for example, it is
routine in many districts for a defendant, as part of a plea, to waive
the right to direct and collateral review of the legality of the upcoming
sentencing proceeding8 or the actual sentence imposed. 9 A defendant
can prospectively waive the right to an impartial judge, competent
1. Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 697-99 (2001); Nancy
Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV.
113, 114-15 (1999).
2. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 791
(2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political Constitution]; accord William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v.
Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES
351 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disap-
pearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Criminal Law's Disappear-
ing Shadow]. The literature evaluating plea bargaining is enormous, and much of it is critical.
For collections of some of the more influential works, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S
TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD
H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch. 21 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2007);
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The
Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1368-69 nn.34-39 (2003).
3. LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 2, § 21.6(a) nn.35-38 (collecting cases).
4. Id. § 21.2(e) n.242 (collecting conflicting authority).
5. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622, 630-31 (2002) (collecting cases); LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 2, § 21.6(a)
(collecting cases).
6. See, e.g., Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 113 F. App'x 374, 376 (10th Cir. 2004) (refusing to consider
a claim of ineffective assistance after the defendant terminated the trial by pleading guilty:
"[Nione of the alleged errors Defendant cites pertain to plea negotiations. Rather, Defendant
argues that Counsel's poor previous trial performance put him in a position in which a plea was
simply the best option .... [T]his is not the sort of argument which survives a waiver of post-
conviction rights.").
8. See, e.g., United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that "the
prosecutor may insist, as a condition of a plea, that the defendant waive all appellate rights").
9. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar-Muniz, 156 F.3d 974, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1998).
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counsel at sentencing,' 0 or the right to have every element of the of-
fense proven. 1 As part of the only empirical study of appeal waivers
to date, Professor Michael O'Neill and I found that in a random sam-
ple of 971 written plea agreements submitted to the United States
Sentencing Commission between October 2003 and June 2004, 63%
contained express waivers of the right to review past and future error;
in some districts virtually every plea agreement contained such a
waiver.' 2 Anecdotal reports suggest that the use of appeal waivers has
risen in federal cases since 2004. These waivers have been recognized
in state cases as well.' 3 Bargaining away procedural protections has
become so prevalent in criminal adjudications that the Supreme Court
now considers how competing interpretations would be traded at the
bargaining table when it decides the appropriate scope of a constitu-
tional entitlement.' 4
A negotiated waiver will not bar appellate review of an allegation
that the waiver itself was coerced. 15 Still, there is no mandatory re-
view of criminal judgments. Someone must draw attention to the ille-
gality of a bargain. If the parties do not, it is highly unlikely that
anyone else will.
B. Trading Substantive Law: Offense Definitions and
Authorized Penalties
Procedural protections are considered the defendant's to use or
lose. So long as defendants receive sentences authorized by the legis-
lature for the crimes they have committed, we let them trade procedu-
10. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting author-
ity from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits that holds a waiver of the right to
challenge a sentence collaterally includes a waiver of the right to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance at sentencing, and noting that "a contrary result would permit a defendant to circum-
vent the terms of the sentence-appeal waiver simply by recasting a challenge to his sentence as a
claim of ineffective assistance, thus rendering the waiver meaningless"); Nancy J. King &
Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209,
246-48 (2005) (discussing appellate enforcement of waivers of ineffective assistance at
sentencing).
11. Cf King & O'Neill, supra note 10, at 249-50 (noting decisions upholding waiver of Ap-
prendi challenges).
12. Id. at 243.
13. See, e.g., Spann v. State, 704 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that a post-trial agree-
ment between the state and a convicted defendant that requires the defendant to waive all rights
to appellate review in exchange for a reduced sentence was invalid as a matter of public policy
and a violation of due process, but that the same considerations were not present for an appeal
waiver included in a plea bargain).
14. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 255-57 (2005).
15. Some prosecutors and judges have proposed to me that a defendant should be able to
waive even this sort of claim.
2007]
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ral rights for reductions in punishment and charges. Indeed, several
scholars have urged federal courts to place more constitutional limits
on penalties and crimes in the hope that judges will restrict the vast
discretion that prosecutors wield in negotiations and sentencing. t 6
But even these substantive limits on punishment-the definitions of
crimes and defenses and the sentences authorized for each offense-
can be waived in plea agreements along with procedural protections.
When expedient, courts have tolerated entirely unauthorized pun-
ishments such as banishment, 17 castration,18 sterilization, 19 and fines
and forfeitures beyond what the law allows. 20 Even Eighth Amend-
16. Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 2, at 838 (arguing that "[flor all crimes with a
sentence of incarceration, prosecutors should be required to show that some number of other
defendants in factually similar cases within the same state have been convicted of the same
crime" and that for all significant sentences, prosecutors should be required to show that
sentences at least as severe have been imposed some minimum number of times for the same
crime on similar facts), see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A
Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 591-94 (2001) (advocating consti-
tutionalizing desuetude).
17. Colquitt, supra note 1, at 735-37 & nn.245-53; Bringing Back Banishment as a Sentencing
Option?, http://www.sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy (Mar. 19, 2006, 10:11
EST) (noting, in a state where appellate case law clearly does not allow banishment orders, a
case where a judge ordered the defendant to "leave Alabama and [the] USA," and admitted he
has imposed similar orders for years). The judge said, "If I can't, somebody could appeal it." Id.
He also noted that "[n]either lawyers nor defendants have questioned such orders." Id.
18. Bruno v. State, 837 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); ACLU v. State, 5 S.W.3d 418,
421 (Ark. 1999) (discussing a defendant's agreement to surgical castration in return for a lighter
sentence); cf. Bill Rankin, Castration May Await Convicted Molester, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan.
13, 2000, at C1 (reporting that a judge conditioned a defendant's release from sentence of life
without parole plus thirty years upon the defendant first undergoing surgical castration). But see
People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App.), modified, 353 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1984)
(holding that chemical castration condition exceeded judicial authority under probation statute);
State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411-12 (S.C. 1985) (striking down an agreed-upon condition of
surgical castration as a form of mutilation prohibited by state law).
19. State v. Pasicznyk, No. 14897-1-Il, 1997 WL 79501 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1997) (al-
lowing the defendant to exchange voluntary sterilization for the recommendation of a lighter
sentence); cf Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President's Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CAL.
L. REV. 1665, 1694 n.174 (2001) (collecting authority). But see People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
263, 271 (Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting stipulated probation condition that a defendant not become
pregnant).
20. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 55-58 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court's opinion could have authorized forfeiture of the small bank account that peti-
tioner opened while a young boy, which had not been augmented since 1975, and arguing that
"[a] court is not free to exceed those [legal] boundaries solely because a defendant has agreed to
permit it to do so"); United States v. McAninch, 109 F. App'x 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining
because of waiver to address the defendant's argument that a fine was not authorized); United
States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that appeal may be barred by a
waiver even "where the sentence was conceivably imposed in an illegal fashion or in violation of
the Guidelines, but ... within the range contemplated in the plea agreement"); Colquitt, supra
note 1, at 723 n.158, 740, 746 n.290 (discussing. forfeiture of property).
392
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ment rights are subject to barter.2' The definition of the offense itself
can be discarded. Defendants may choose to plead guilty to crimes
they did not commit; they may even plead guilty to a crime that does
not technically exist.22 Very little is known about how often these ille-
gal punishments are imposed; for every agreement which a defendant
seeks to undo, there are similar bargains that no one has contested.
Even if judges decide to forbid parties from skirting legislative lim-
its, bargaining will remain "lawless" in another sense. Because of-
fense definitions overlap, and no judge can force a prosecutor to
charge any particular offense,2 3 "mandatory" sentences are routinely
avoided by negotiation.24 In criminal cases, "the settlement price is
determined by prosecutors' preferences, not by the law."'25 With such
a broad range of offenses and penalties to choose from, parties may
first agree upon a sentence and then find the offense that fits-not the
other way around. 26
III. WHY RESTRICT SETrLEMENT?
Given the undeniable benefits that bargaining affords defendants
and the justice system, it is not clear that more regulation of the settle-
ment process is warranted. For example, courts need not interfere
with the consensual abandonment of statutory rights absent legislative
intent that such rights should be impervious to waiver. A legislature is
capable of requiring mandatory review or per se reversal for viola-
tions of the commands it holds most dear.27 By allowing unfettered
bartering of its own legal rules, a legislature acquiesces in the uneven
application of those rules from case to case and location to location.
As for constitutional protections, counseled defendants generally
should be able to assess the value of their own rights. Judicial pater-
21. See King, supra note 1, at 172-76; Christy Chandler, Note, Voluntary Executions, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1897 (1998).
22. LAFAVE. ISRAEL & KING, supra note 2, § 21.4(f) nn.160-61; Albert W. Alschuler, The
Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1142-43 (1976) (collecting
cases); Colquitt, supra note 1. at 740-41 (collecting cases).
23. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rock-
efeller. 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2005).
25. Stuntz, Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, supra note 2, at 2550.
26. King et al., supra note 24, at 986 n.97; see also David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the
Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 591 (2005).
27. King, supra note 1, at 141 ("[Clourts should presume that the responsibility for policing
the evasion of statutory requirements rests initially with the legislature, not the courts."); see also
Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976 (2006) (finding that Congress made it clear that a cer-
tain provision of the Speedy Trial Act was not subject to waiver by the defendant).
2007]
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nalism is no justification for upending a bargain in which the defen-
dant knowingly and voluntarily trades individual entitlements under
the Constitution for greater certainty or lesser punishment.
Interference would, however, be justified for at least two reasons.
First, judges should not allow a defendant to waive judicial review of
the validity of the waiver itself. This review would determine whether
a defendant's waiver was made with knowledge and without coercion,
while competent, and with the effective assistance of counsel. So far,
judges have refused to interpret blanket appeal waivers as barring
such scrutiny, and they should continue to do so.
Second, judges should reject agreements that undercut important
public interests that are supposed to be safeguarded by the enforce-
ment of constitutional commands, but that are undervalued by the
parties. In other words, defendants should not be permitted to barter
away that which is not entirely theirs to trade. I have discussed a few
such interests elsewhere: the preservation of the balance of power
between federal and state governments, the separation of power be-
tween the branches of government, and the public's interest in prohib-
iting cruel and unusual or excessive punishments.28 The consent of an
individual prosecutor and defendant is not an adequate reason to dis-
regard these important constitutional values.
IV. THE LIMITS OF CASE-BY-CASE JUDICIAL
REGULATION OF BARGAINING
While the societal costs of free-for-all bargaining in criminal cases
may justify additional regulation, delegating to judges the entire re-
sponsibility for policing party behavior is a mistake. 29 Assume
lawmakers in a given jurisdiction are persuaded by the rising scholarly
chorus that unregulated bargaining in criminal cases is threatening the
accuracy of criminal judgments. Plea agreements can produce two
types of fictitious judgments. Most troublesome are cases in which
28. King, supra note 1, at 154-60, 172-76.
29. Scholarly commentary urging that more steps be taken to increase the accuracy of plea-
bargained adjudications is growing. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow
of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and
the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1611 & nn.93-95 (2005)
("What replaces jury trials as the check on the executive branch is not judicial scrutiny of evi-
dence, but defendants' consent."); Colquitt, supra note 1; Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial
Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1123 (2005); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Stuntz, Criminal Law's Dis-
appearing Shadow, supra note 2; Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 2, at 832-39; Jenia
lontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 199, 213-14 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
[Vol. 56:389
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defendants enter guilty pleas when they are actually innocent, leaving
the real offender unprosecuted. 30 As demonstrated by DNA exonera-
tions of plea-convicted defendants, these entirely false pleas do oc-
cur.31 A second sort of inaccuracy results when defendants who have
committed serious crimes plead guilty to less serious crimes they did
not commit; these defendants receive sentences less severe than what
the law would require for what really happened. In this scenario, the
defendant does not suffer undeserved punishment. 32 What does suf-
fer, however, is the credibility of criminal judgments33 and the consis-
tent application of substantive criminal law, two values unlikely to be
of concern to either party to a negotiated settlement.
One way for a legislature or appellate court to address concerns
about inaccuracy in negotiated criminal cases is to demand that trial
judges reject agreements that include fictitious convictions or
sentences based on inaccurate facts.34 But to oversee the accuracy of
representations in plea agreements effectively, trial judges need more
30. Defendants may also enter what are known as Alford pleas, protesting their innocence,
but securing the benefits of a guilty plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 26-27
(1970) (upholding such a plea given "strong evidence of guilt"); Bibas, supra note 2. Pleas of
nolo contendere do not even require a factual basis. See Leipold, supra note 29, at 1154-58, 1164
(criticizing both nolo and Alford pleas); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and
Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412 (2003).
31. But DNA exonerations of plea-convicted defendants are much less frequent than exonera-
tions of defendants convicted after trial. See Alex Leary, Exonerations Stir Bids to Expand DNA
Testing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 30, 2006, http:/Iwww.sptimes.com/2006/01/30/State/
Exonerationsstirbid.shtml (reporting that "of the 174 exonerations nationwide, seven have in-
volved guilty pleas"); see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005). Professor Gross explained these
findings:
Only twenty of the exonerees in our database pled guilty, less than six percent of the
total: fifteen innocent murder defendants and four innocent rape defendants who took
deals that included long prison terms in order to avoid the risk of life imprisonment or
the death penalty, and one innocent defendant pled guilty to gun possession to avoid
life imprisonment as a habitual criminal. By contrast, thirty-one of the thirty-nine Tulia
defendants pled guilty to drug offenses they did not commit, as did the majority of the
100 or more exonerated defendants in the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles .... They
were exonerated because the false convictions in their cases were produced by system-
atic programs of police perjury that were uncovered as part of large scale
investigations.
Id. at 536-37.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 24 n.17 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Commenta-
tors have raised as a possible infirmity of fact bargaining that a defendant would receive an
unduly lenient sentence because the government did not fully disclose the facts. Such circum-
stances, of course, benefit defendants, so there is no concern about intrusion on a defendant's
constitutional rights.").
33. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDU-
RAL JUSTICE (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
34. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 29, at 2542-43 (advocating more thorough judicial review).
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information than they currently receive. They require independent
pre-sentence reports, prepared from adequately funded investigations
and available to the judge prior to the approval of plea agreements. 35
Because many judges consider oversight of the plea-bargaining pro-
cess as improper judicial participation in plea negotiations, 36 rules
against judicial participation in negotiations would have to be modi-
fied to encourage judges to question unusual or unlawful terms and to
insist on a strong factual basis. 37
The more fundamental problem with relying on heightened vigi-
lance by judges is that judges are under more pressure to facilitate
deals than to scrutinize them. Settlements move their dockets along.
Judges may be hesitant to create more work for themselves by re-
jecting agreements that are acceptable to both parties. In short, many
attorneys, judges, and defendants will tolerate fictitious agreements so
long as they efficiently resolve their cases. 38 Appellate judges, too,
have actively encouraged appeal waivers. 39 It is entirely rational for
judges to welcome waivers in cases where defendants have admitted
guilt so that more appellate resources can be devoted to cases in
which defendants have claimed innocence all along. Consequently, a
strategy of judicially enforced regulation of bargaining will fail with-
out better tools for oversight and an entirely different set of
incentives.40
More importantly, without effective judicial enforcement, adding
procedural rights designed to prevent inaccurate convictions may ac-
35. Alschuler, supra note 22, at 1146-47; Brown, supra note 29, at 1628-30 (advocating judi-
cial access to the prosecutor's investigative file and independent investigation); Turner, supra
note 29, at 259 (urging "judges to inquire more thoroughly into the facts of the case early, before
the parties have agreed on a version of the facts" and advocating disclosure to the judge of the
same evidence that the parties would receive under liberal discovery rules).
36. See, e.g., LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 2, § 21.3(d) (collecting authority); Al-
schuler, supra note 22, at 1092-95. For a collection of authority supporting the contrary view,
see LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 2, § 21.3(d) nn.176.1-2.
37. Turner, supra note 29 (comparing American and German systems and arguing that more
involvement and information for judges in bargaining can improve accuracy). Rules limiting
judicial participation in plea negotiations have been based on the risk that for the trial judges to
threaten a higher sentence if the defendant does not plead guilty would be too coercive, and
would actually increase inaccuracy and lawlessness. See Colquitt, supra note 1, at 743-45 (advo-
cating that judges should refrain from participating). Several thoughtful alternatives have been
advanced for minimizing this risk, such as providing a separate judge for sentencing after trial,
appellate review for vindictive sentencing, and recording negotiation sessions. Alschuler, supra
note 22, at 1148.
38. Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punish-
ment, 58 STAN. L. REv. 293 (2005).
39. King & O'Neill, supra note 10, at 221.
40. Brown, supra note 29, at 1641 (noting that rewarding judges who enforce law against party
collusion may require "restructuring the incentives that construct the judicial role").
[Vol. 56:389
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tually exacerbate the accuracy problem. For example, broadening the
discovery due to a defendant prior to a plea may not achieve the de-
sired objective of providing more information to the defense.4' As
Professor Darryl Brown has recognized, enlarging discovery rights
before the plea would lead to greater information exchange only if
those rights were enforced rather than traded as part of the bargain. 42
In cases where discovery will be costly to the government, a prosecu-
tor will be willing to give, and a defendant willing to receive, lesser
punishment in exchange for dispensing with what would otherwise be
a costly requirement. Without judges willing to block settlements that
include the waiver of new legal rules, those rules will just add to the
pile of chips already on the table. 43 Providing new rights for the ac-
cused may actually risk deepening the differential between punish-
ment after trial and punishment by plea-one of the potential
contributors to wrongful convictions. 44
V. BEYOND JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT: SYSTEMATIC REGULATION OF
THE BARGAINING ENVIRONMENT
Because of the inherent limits of case-by-case judicial enforcement,
and the likelihood that new regulations on bargaining will themselves
be traded away, legislators interested in regulating bargaining should
consider a different approach. The most effective regulation of crimi-
nal adjudication and settlement will come from legislative initiatives
and policies that the parties are unable to modify by agreement. 45
Consider again the example of a legislature interested in taking
steps to reduce the incidence of guilty pleas by defendants who are
innocent. The first step should be to learn more about false pleas and
the conditions that lead defendants to plead guilty to crimes they did
not commit. Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain why
an innocent person may plead guilty; all of them are difficult to test.
A defendant may believe that although he is innocent, he would be
convicted at trial, and should accept the sentence offered rather than
41. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2531-40; Brown, supra note 29, at 1622-25.
42. Brown, supra note 29, at 1626-27 & n.154.
43. There is another reason to look beyond judicial review of individual settlements for regu-
latory solutions: the details of an agreement may never be disclosed to the judge if these depar-
tures from the law appear expedient to both parties. Indeed, the only legal rules in the criminal
process that are truly mandatory are those rules that will always require relief, no matter when,
or by whom, a violation is discovered. In some states, such errors may be limited to "subject
matter jurisdiction." See LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 2, § 21.6(a) n.22 (collecting au-
thority). But see King, supra note 1, at 144-47 (noting the indeterminacy of that term).
44. Brown, supra note 29, at 1612.
45. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 1276 (2005).
20071
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suffer the more severe consequences he would face if convicted. 46 A
defendant might make this choice because that's what his attorney
tells him,47 because he distrusts the system or the jury or judge, be-
cause he is risk averse,48 or because he has already falsely confessed 49
and believes this confession makes acquittal impossible. Or a defen-
dant may conclude that other benefits of the plea bargain (e.g., dismis-
sal of charges against a relative) areworth the sacrifice. Studies that
systematically diagnose what went wrong in cases where defendants
pled guilty but were later exonerated by DNA testing have begun to
shed light on why false pleas occur. Laws that ease restrictions on
postconviction DNA testing for guilty plea cases could add to our un-
derstanding.50 Although postconviction DNA exonerations have been
necessarily limited to very serious crimes where biological evidence is
available on the issue of identity, there is reason to believe that inno-
cent defendants charged with lesser crimes may also plead falsely
when the jail time for a guilty plea is significantly less than what they
would face after trial.51 Indeed, the weaker the evidence of guilt, the
deeper the discount offered by prosecutors. 52
After diagnosing the likely causes of false pleas, the second step for
a legislature interested in improving the accuracy of criminal judg-
ments would be to tailor reforms to address those conditions directly.
For example, if false confessions significantly raise the probability that
an innocent defendant will waive trial and plead guilty, steps should
be taken to prevent false confessions. Potential reforms might include
the following: (1) changing those features of interrogations that have
46. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1296 (1975); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 309-12 (1983); Eunyung Theresa Oh, Note, Innocence After "Guilt": Postconviction
DNA Relief for Innocents Who Pled Guilty, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161, 166-70 (2004).
47. Bibas, supra note 2, at 1383-84.
48. Leipold, supra note 29, at 1154; see also Brown, supra note 29, at 1612 (arguing that
"[diefendants who are risk-averse, or who plausibly distrust adjudication's capacity to vindicate
false charges, can sensibly accede to inaccurate pleas to avoid the risk of graver consequences");
Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 494 & nn.56-58 (2000) (discussing
accounts of innocent defendants who pled guilty and their reasons for doing so).
49. Brown, supra note 29, at 1593-97.
50. See Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 2, at 836 ("In place of current procedure-
heavy review, appellate courts should test outcomes for accuracy-using DNA or other reliable
forensic evidence where possible-and keep good records of where and how mistakes happen.
Institutions that regularly convict innocents should be enjoined to follow more stringent
procedures.").
51. Bibas, supra note 29 (discussing the need for capping plea discounts to reduce risk that
innocent defendants will plead guilty); Wright, supra note 29 (suggesting that very significant
plea discounts are leading defendants to forego defenses that would have succeeded at trial); see
also Bibas, supra note 2, at 1378 n.81 (noting practitioner report).
52. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2535-36.
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been demonstrated to lead to false confessions;5 3 (2) using identifica-
tion procedures that increase accuracy in order to prevent faulty eye-
witness identifications; (3) providing financial and political rewards to
prosecutors' offices for reforms that improve screening;54 and (4)
adopting statewide standards for training, quality, and auditing of fo-
rensic labs.55 To assure such standards are enforced despite the will-
ingness of parties and judges to overlook them in particular cases, a
legislature must include sanctions for violations other than relief for
those defendants who protest. Finally, if inaccurate convictions are
traced to poor representation, revisions in the resources allocated to
public defenders' offices-changes that are not subject to waiver by
the parties-may have a greater impact than tinkering with the post-
conviction rules governing ineffective assistance claims.56 This is the
sort of law that stands a chance of making a difference in criminal
settlements because it is impervious to dealing by defendants, prose-
cutors, and judges.
VI. CONCLUSION
Criminal law is a natural stronghold for legal formalism because it
vindicates public, not private, interests. After all, criminal justice is
about law enforcement. But much of criminal law and procedure now
belongs to the parties-not the public. And if parties find it advanta-
geous to bargain around the law, few judges will stand in their way.
Legislators hoping to regulate bargaining should look to innovative
proposals that have an impact regardless of the parties' decision to
negotiate.
53. Many believe, for example, that videotaping interrogations may prevent, or reveal, situa-
tions presenting higher probabilities of false confessions. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Wrongful
Conviction Prompts Detroit Police to Videotape Certain Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2006, at A14.
54. See Brown, supra note 29, at 1600; Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 2, at 824-25
(arguing that "civil injunctions should be the primary remedy for constitutional wrongs, in order
to reward criminal justice institutions that perform well and punish those that do badly"); Ron-
ald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN ST. L. REV.
1087 (2005) (describing features of New Jersey law that promote uniform and accountable deci-
sions by prosecutors); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55
STAN. L. REV. 29, 58 (2002).
55. Brown, supra note 29, at 1643.
56. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2540 (arguing public defenders may make the best use of limited
funds because of economies of scale); see also Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Con-
viction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337, 371-74 (2006)
(collecting authority calling for increased funding for the defense of indigents as a means of
protecting against wrongful convictions); Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 2, at 836-37.
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